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DEFINING FEMINISM, DEFINING FEMINISMS
REGINALD Ott'
It is fitting that the first chapter of this wonderful Symposium is entitled
"Defining Feminism." That is because the struggle of subordinated persons
and groups is, at its heart, the struggle for subordinated persons and groups
to be able to define the reality and truth of their lived experiences, to be able
to define and validate the truth of one's reality in the face of pervasive racist,
sexist, classist, and homophobic messages.
Why? Women, people of color, the poor, and gays and lesbians are
constantly having their experiential reality discounted, devalued, rejected,
and ignored. They are constantly being told that their problems with racism,
sexism, classism, heterosexism, are just "all in their head." For example,
women are told by men to stop "complaining" about gender inequality
because women need to accept that inequalities between the sexes flow from
natural differences between the sexes. People of color are told by whites that
they are being racist and "playing the race card" whenever they identify
patterns of institutionaJized racism. Within such a context, to be able to
define one's own reality is the first step in the process of constructing a
contextualized identity that can enable and empower subordinated peoples
in their struggle for liberation and recognition as autonomous human
beings.
The harm of having one's life defined through the experiential lens of
another is to be treated as an "It" in theologian Martin Buber's terminology.'
Buber contrasts what he calls an "I-It" relationship with an "I-Thou"
relationship. 2 In the "I-It" relationship, one person treats another person as
an "it," an object to be categorized and controlled to advance the self
interests of the "l." 3 Within an "I-It" relationship, a person fails to
acknowledge, recognize, and honor the autonomous being that stands across
from him or her. The person refuses to see the other person except but in
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his or her own pre-defined image of what the other person is or should be.
In contrast, Buber describes an "I-Thou" relationship as one in which a
person recognizes and treats the other person as the free, autonomous
human being that she or he is. 4 In an "I-Thou" relationship, the "I" does not
attempt to make or recreate the "Thou" into the "I's" image of who the
"Thou" should or should not be. In an "I-Thou" relationship, the "I" lets go
of trying to judge and control the other person's beliefs, thoughts, and
emotions, and tries to learn and accept the other person's experience, her
truth, her reality.
W.E.B. Dubois has articulated and described with intense clarity the
insidious psychic harm of having one's self constantly defined by others
through the lens of racism.
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with
second-sight in this American world,-a world which yields him no
true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the
revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the
eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that
looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,
an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength
alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife-this
longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self
into a better and truer self. ... 5
In articulating the insidious harm of "double-consciousness," Dubois was
describing the painful feeling and experience of a being viewed as a
racialized "It" by white society. 6 Dubois' notion of "double-consciousness,"
the "sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others,"
describes the inner reality and mindset of a person who lives in a society
where he or she is pervasively treated as an "It." 7
Several decades after Dubois talked about "double-consciousness,"
Martin Luther King Jr. theorized about how the "I-It''. relationship between
whites and blacks manifested itself in institutional, systemic form through the
practice of racial segregation. 8 In his "Letter from A Birmingham Jai~" King
wrote,
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All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the
soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense
of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority.
Segregation, to use the terminology of. . . Martin Buber, substitutes
an "I-It" relationship for an "I-Thou" relationship and ends up
relegating persons to the status of things. 9
Thus, both King and Dubois understand that whites, in viewing African
Americans as racial inferiors and in segregating and invidiously
discriminating against African Americans, were treating African Americans as
objects, as "Its." 10
The "It" consciousness is one that all subordinated groups have
experienced.
Historically, with regard to gender relations, the "I-It"
relationship has paradigmatically taken the I (Man) - It (woman) dynamic, a
dynamic that still continues to repeat itself with consistent persistency to this
day, although this dynamic now continues within the superficial structures of
a formalistic "equal opportunity" society that is equal mainly in terms of law
but still unequal when the concrete reality of the experience of women is
examined. Thus, a woman experiences "double-consciousness" when she
self-consciously experiences the feeling of looking at her self through the
eyes of men, and ends up judging and condemning her self through those
same external eyes. In short, a person experiencing double consciousness
ends up treating him or herself as an object, as an "It."
To move towards full substantive equality and liberty for all, it is
necessary for members of subordinated groups, to paraphrase Dubois, to
"merge his or her double self into" an integrated, autonomous self. 11 To that
end, a first step for subordinated peoples is to first realize that racist and
sexist messages that they have heard all their lives do not define the true
essence of their selfhood.
Hence, Feminists urgently need to define Feminism and to construct
feminist theories that validate and affirm the truth of women's lived
experience, in all their multiplicity and diversity. Because feminist theories
are forged through the diverse experiences of differently situated women, it
is respectfully suggested that the title of this Chapter may and can be seen as
the call to define Feminism and Feminism(s). Defining feminism(s) means,
in spirit of the "I-Thou" relationship, being mindful and respectful that
individual Feminists will define Feminism in alignment with the truth of
their unique experience, in alignment with the truth of their unique reality.
Viewing the call to define feminism as the call to define feminism(s),
we can better understand the call for anti-essentialism in feminist and critical
9
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race theory. 12 The call for anti-essentialism is a recognition that attempts to
declare one experiential perspective (this issue is about racism.0 as being the
correct perspective over another perspective (therefare, this issue is not about
sexism.0, is an attempt to assert privileged status and in the process, is treating
fellow autonomous humans as "Its," as objects. The desire to define and
essentialize others, therefore, is simply another manifestation of racial and
gender hierarchy and domination.
Too often, however, the consensus that we need to hear and
understand subordination from multiple perspectives gets lost in territorial
fights to claim an experience as the exclusive or primary experience of one
group over another. Such territorial in-fighting occurs when people are
locked in an "I-It" relationship. In an "I-It" relationship, one group seeks to
impose its definition and understanding of a situation or issue upon others.
In this situation, it becomes impossible to construct and create inter
subjective knowledge through a mutual exchange and sharing of differing
personal, experiential, emotional, and cognitive perspectives. On the
contrary, people stuck within an "I-It" relationship end up stifling the
construction of a truly inter-subjective knowledge that incorporates the full
range of human experiences and perspectives.
What does it mean to go about the task of defining Feminisms? It
means, for one thing, that we ought to ask what we can learn about systems
of subordination by viewing such systems from multiple perspectives.
Jacqueline Mertz's essay, for example, discusses the Yvonne Wanrow case
from both a feminist and Native American perspective, without attempting to
define one perspective as the "true" perspective, and the other perspective as
a subordinate or tangential perspective. 13 From this inclusive, multiple
orientation approach, Mertz asks us: What can and do we learn about one
another by viewing this issue from the perspective of feminist theory? What
do we learn about one another by viewing this issue from the perspective of a
Native American? What do we learn about one another by viewing this issue
from the perspective of a Native American woman? In reading her article,
one wonders whether it is possible for defense attorneys to construct legal
defenses that take the perspective of Native American women, taking into
full consideration the multidimensional subordination 14 Native American
12 See generally Elizabeth V. Spelman, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 19 (1988); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism ( M Other -isms), 1991 DUKE
LJ. 397 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.

581 (1990).
13 See Jacqueline Mertz, Women of ColM-What Their Voices Teach Us, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
LJ.205 (2003).
14 The term "multidimensional subordination" is borrowed from Professor Darren
Hutchinson.
See Darren
Lenard
Hutchinson,
Identity
Crisis:
"lntersectionality,"
"Multidimensionality," and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE &
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women have experienced in the United States.
Similarly, Kimberly Charles, based on her experience and perspective,
seeks to construct a Feminism rooted in the teachings of Christianity. 15 She
insightfully deconstructs the sexism in Fundamentalist Christian beliefs, to
help show that sexism is not an intrinsic aspect of Christianity. In doing so,
she opens up the possibility of developing a Christian theology that seeks to
end the subordination of women, and opens up the possibility of speaking to
and raising feminist consciousness among women and men of Christian
faith.
This Symposium is an insightful step in the process of defining
Feminism(s). I have learned much in reading these articles, and I hope to
engage in future dialogue with these Feminist legal theorists.

LAW285 (2001).
15 See Kimberly Charles, Sexism is a "Family Value, "9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 255 (2003).
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